Democracy translates from Ancient Greek as the ‘rule of the people’ and can be defined as a form of government where the citizens of a given region have a say in the governing decisions that affect them (Shapiro et al, 2024). Here, I will use Bosio’s (2020) definition of war being both a literal conflict as well as an ideological tension that poses a significant threat to world order, with the potential result of immense destruction, the primary example of which being the Cold War. This definition best encapsulates war in the present day, by acknowledging the modernisation of warfare from conventional troop-fought wars to technologically innovative state defence, demonstrating contemporary military superiority (Chin, 2019; English, 2013; Murphy, 1981). To break down the question further, it is worth noting that ‘possible’ does not necessarily equate to ‘right,’ ‘correct’ or ‘moral,’ which is significant because these meanings can become conflated, often used interchangeably, something I seek to avoid in this essay. Therefore, this question asks whether the popular consensus is adequate justification of conflicts of any scale, regardless of the impacts this may have.

This essay will explore the justification of war through two dichotomous ideologies used in international relations, notably realism and liberalism, exploring their differing views regarding conflict, as this will provide a balanced argument concerning the seemingly perpetually topical question. The realist approach would argue in favour of justifying war in the name of democracy due to the crucial importance of defending state sovereignty (Kelly, 2004), therefore making conflict justifiable survival mechanism for nation states to take (Reccia, 2009). This approach assumes countries are rational entities, naturally sceptical of other states (Somers, 1998), and suggests nations should not fully trust each other, with Flavius Vegetius (4^th Century) stating, ‘if you want peace [and democracy], you must prepare for war,’ (Goedde, 2019) highlighting the importance of war as a core realist value. Thus, realists would argue that war can be justified in the name of democracy because war protects (democratic) states, and therefore protects democracies. However, the liberalist approach would disagree with this idea, placing value on collaboration over international borders (O’Connell, 2017), which is arguably more progressive, enabling countries to strive towards an improved global society for all, rather than constantly involving themselves in self-interested conflict to obtain a greater degree of wealth and power (Brosio, 2017). This approach suggests that wars can’t be justified in the name of democracy as they are not in the best interest of people, and avoidance of war is ideal as it is not worth the costs economically, politically, socially and psychologically as considerable amounts of civilian casualties and mass destruction of infrastructure is far from desirable (Bloor, 2022), therefore liberalists would condemn the involvement in warfare, due to its immense destruction of nations, livelihoods, and diplomatic relations.

Overall, this essay will argue against the question and suggest that despite the importance realists place on protecting state sovereignty, war cannot be justified due to the immeasurable harm it brings, in which justification of such atrocities would appear entirely unethical. Furthermore, the progressive nature of the liberal ideology makes it more up to date and suited to the current political environment, adding weight to this argument.

Firstly, I will draw on power as a key theme in this debate, and a fundamental concept in politics due to its relevance in determining political hierarchies, alliances and relations (Keohan et al, 1973). Power undoubtably drives political actions (Lilleker and Koc-Michalska, 2018; Tarrow, 2022) and can be the reason states may go to war (Kim and Morrow, 2022) making it a central area of focus in this discussion. Realists may consider power as the most essential aspect of political dispute, which their approach logically accounts for, particularly in an increasingly competitive global landscape (Walker and Morton, 2005), thus making war appear as a reasonable option in accumulating or maintaining the greatly valued resource of power, which democratic states use to protect themselves, therefore realists could argue that war can be a useful tool to protect themselves internationally, and then are able to maintain internal democratic order, justifying war if necessary.

The realist ideology favours ‘hard power,’ (Pallaver, 2011) a militaristic approach using force, economic coercion, sanctions and trade barriers which nations utilise to achieve strategic goals (Lee, 2024; Bloor, 2022). Countries with lots of ‘hard power’ (e.g. a prominent military and strong defence systems) such as America, China and Russia, are able to achieve their goals and project strength globally whereas those without a great deal of hard power are more vulnerable and susceptible to coercion (Lee, 2024), illustrating the importance of power transnationally, from the realist perspective. Hard power is arguably the most direct form of power used to exert dominance globally (Paul, 2005). For example, America has one of the largest militaries worldwide (O’Hanlon, 2016) which is frequently used to protect national democratic interests, notable examples being the military intervention in Korea and Vietnam against the communist threat of ‘domino theory’ (Rice, 2000; Nye, 1999; Tyreman, 2024) as realist nations are willing to employ military power and are subsequently involved in various conflicts, therefore making justification of war arguably a necessity in the realist school of thought to protecting national sovereignty, and ideologically protecting their own democracies (Morkevicius, 2015).

Conversely, the liberal approach favours ‘soft power’ (Nye, 1990) and suggests that this may come to replace ‘hard power’ (Biglin, 2008; Bloor, 2022) due to the focus on attraction and coercion, incentivising actors via cultural and social values rather than through militaristic means, as liberals might argue the effectiveness of such belligerent methods are declining (Bloor, 2022). This alternative form of power denotes the liberal preference to avoid conflict, acknowledging the importance of other less threatening factors in achieving goals, perhaps suggesting that ‘hard power’ and war is an example of unnecessary ‘hawkish’ deployment of military used to attempt to achieve international goals.

For example, the end of the Vietnam War was arguably due to, or at least catalysed by, the anti-war protests such as the march in Washington D.C. 1969 with over half a million protesters (New York Times, 2011). The emergence and prevalence of this campaign in popular culture was a defining feature of the movement (Macadam and Su, 2002), with events such as the Summer of Love in California 1968 and the Woodstock festival 1969 drawing greater attention to the issue. This manifestation of the political protests into the social sphere raised a significant amount of recognition to the campaign, thus giving it more credence, having an influence over the end of the conflicts through persuasive, non-coercive means. America’s forceful use of ‘hard power’ here helped them achieve very little in terms of outcomes in this instance, whereas the cultural manipulation of the anti-war protests seemingly had a greater effect, pressuring the politicians to act accordingly to the wishes of the nation, who were generally opposed to American intervention (Rowe, 1991). This highlights how ‘soft power,’ which places emphasis on democratic values and the will of the people, appears as a dominant force, with the seemingly visible erosion of ‘hard power.’

The mobilisation of the masses gives weight to any campaign as protest then becomes recognisable on a much wider scale (Cutts, 2021), a more recent example being the ‘Stop the War’ campaign in England (2003) where 1.5 million marched in protest to British military intervention in Iraq (Cortwright, 2007), causing pressure on the government to evaluate the effectiveness and morality of this conflict. These examples depict how war is not in the best interests of the people, with millions protesting or opposed to conflict, making it appear somewhat despicable that governments in the present day even attempt to justify war, when the democratic consensus clearly opposes this.

To elaborate upon the previous theme of power, the ‘power balance,’ referring to the global distribution of power (Lee, 2024), is another integral concept to consider. Power dynamics can cause political unrest among nation states, with growing insecurity and scepticism, potentially resulting in war or conflict for those at risk of losing some of their relative power (Walt, 1985; Torbett, 2010).

Powerful realist nations, notably America, prefer a unipolar stability (Doyle, 1986) as this ensures their survival against other states, reducing military threat by balancing power (Bloor, 2022). This means that realist nations readily undergo war or similar equivalent techniques (such as the aforementioned trade barriers and economic sanctions) in order to maintain a higher concentration of global power, thus justifying the use of warfare as a means to protect strength and ensure survival of the state, tilting the power balance in their favour (Morkevicius, 2015). This then allows nations to improve democratic communities within their cartographically drawn state boundaries, justifying war where necessary to protect the state internally and protect the citizens (Slaughter and Burke-White, 2006; International Commission on Intervention, 2001).    

Realists may argue that wars are somewhat essential to maintaining and restoring the balance of power (which they argue is crucial for global stability), preventing the rise of rival ideologies, a current example being the autocratic Chinese threat against liberal, American democracy, thus causing concern for the start of a ‘New Cold War’ emerging between these two nations (Niblett, 2024; Bands, 2021; Woodward, 2017; Zhao, 2019) concerning America particularly as they perceive Chinese geopolitical forces as a threat to their democratic form of governance (Shi, 2008). In the current political landscape, China seemingly conveys the greatest degree of threat to America and Western democracy due to its relatively recent emergence as a global competitor. Allison (2020) suggests that post-financial crisis, China particularly flourished internationally, capitalising on Western economic vulnerability and deficiency, a concern also highlighted by Kissinger (2009), who suggested that the world’s ‘centre of gravity is shifting from the Atlantic to the Pacific’ as China increased the speed of their military operations, to which Mr Xi (2017) responded by saying ‘it’s time for us [China] to take centre stage in the world.’ One could argue this newly emerging tension between both nations is an ideological war driven by American realist concerns over loss of power and Chinese expansion, who are seemingly enlarging their geographical sphere of influence (Niblett, 2024; Roett, 2008), with the balance of power potentially shifting towards China as America appears to be declining in terms of global power share, facing internal fracture (Hill and Reynolds, 2023). America might therefore see this as a threat to democratic regimes, as the relative significance and dominance of their currently hegemonic nation is at risk of erosion. Mearsheimer (2019) suggests that America is unprepared for the rise on other non-liberalist nations taking precedence in the global landscape, therefore from the realist ideology, it would make complete sense and appear entirely justifiable to allow wars to occur, as non-liberalist nations therefore pose a threat to democracy. Therefore, allowing wars against nations bringing alternative (totalitarian for example) views would appear justifiable, and in the near future America might indeed attempt to justify this impending Cold War in the name of democracy, by highlighting the potential threat the Western world could face.

Liberals may however critique the apparent realist fixation with power, as it disregards the humanitarian consequences that wars bring, a realist idea open to liberal questioning over the morality of such wars, with which the national, democratic interest arguably aligns (Chaulia, 2011). The liberalist approach might highlight the sizably consequential threat of nuclear war in the current, and previous volatile political landscape, which emerged as a result of the nuclear arms race of the 1950s (Schwarts, 1993; Tyreman, 2024). During this period, American and Soviet military forces accumulated significant amounts of power and resources which multiplied within this decade, resulting in Mutually Assured Destruction (MacNamara), which continues to elicit widespread concern, arguable causing British military intervention in Iraq 2001 during the early 21^st century, for example. Liberals may also condemn the realist efforts to enhance their own military capabilities due to the threatening risk this poses of nuclear war (Bloor, 2022), and would therefore suggest that war cannot be justified due to the potential deployment of nuclear weapons, which would have vastly destructive impacts on a global scale, with the concern of essentially wiping out humanity (Andregg, 2019; Tyreman, 2024). Therefore, from the liberal approach, it can be argued that war presents a greater risk to democracy, and the realist idea that war could be used to protect democracies is a particularly weak argument, as the deployment of nuclear weapons could eradicate significant proportions of the world’s population (and thus democracy), if war becomes justifiable. This indicates how the liberal approach better appreciates a rational concern for the potential scale of destruction possible as a result of war, and the incomprehensible impacts this would have.

Liberals tend to feel less threatened by other states and instead favour a peaceful coexistence, an idea articulated by Schumpeter, who believed that wars are not in the best interest for individuals or nation states and should therefore be avoided. Kant’s ‘democratic peace theory’ further embodies these ideas, suggesting democratic nations are less likely to go to war with one another due to their mutually shared interests regarding peaceful coexistence and the avoidance of warfare (Reiter, 2012). Some liberals suggest that wars can be avoided through more constructive approaches such as diplomacy, and disputes can be best managed this way instead of through facing the destructive consequences of war. Robertson (2024) advocates for investing in diplomacy as a primary focus in improving and developing global political relations, as this would help resolve tensions, reducing the likelihood of war.

Another core idea in the liberal school of thought is that states are rational and self-interested (Stewart, 1993; Lewin, 1991; Bowels and Gintis, 2000), therefore maintaining good international relations is crucial for state survival, as nation states rely on other countries for trading partners (Bloor, 2022). This means that war between states would seem unjustifiable as it would potentially sacrifice key alliances that states rely on for their survival (Morrow, 2000). Henceforth the use of war would salvage these transnational connections and therefore threaten democracy, potentially having a colossal impact on the population, sacrificing their wellbeing and survival, which unless all citizens are fairly sociopathic, will likely go against their will and therefore makes it impossible to justify wars in the name of democracy. Therefore, liberals might suggest that establishing widespread democracy creates several longer-term benefits, particularly based around cooperation, diplomacy and global governance, as liberalism suggests that democratic nations are more peaceful internationally than non-democratic nations, reducing the likelihood of war (Russett, 2019; Daase, 2006).

In conclusion, it can be more strongly argued that power concerns are inadequate attempts to justify wars, as this is not in the interests of the citizens; the essence of democracy itself. The realist approach is outdated and no longer matches contemporary attitudes to, or means of warfare, hence the opinions regarding the toleration of war have changed generationally (Spitzer, 1973). As technology has developed, the impacts of war have heightened, intensifying and perhaps polarising the general approach to war, as the nature of it has transformed, the militaristic approach appearing more harmful and less effective, posing adverse effects to democracy (Stone, 1996; Goldman and Eliason, 2003). Additionally, wars are polyfactorial events and are far too complex to be reduced to the simplicity of democratic justification despite realist concerns over loss of sovereignty, as in reality, a claim suggesting the war can be justified in the name of democracy is simply insufficient, and would not stand for much on a domestic or international stage, as a much greater level of justification would be required, if justification of war is ever a possibility.

Furthermore, it can be argued that democracy itself is on the decline, with political actors and theorists increasingly looking for alternative forms of governance, making it more difficult to justify wars in the name of an arguably weak system of governance (Plattner, 2015; Runciman, 2018; Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2019). If on the other hand, war could be justified in the name of democracy, this will almost inevitably cause a decrease of trust in democratic governments, entrenching political apathy as many individuals in these nations are typically opposed to war, thus due to the significance of war, the loss of trust would likely become synonymous with governmental actions as a whole (Blind, 2007; Citrin, 1974). Therefore, by opposing the will of the people, justification of war would undermine the whole notion of democracy itself (Daase, 2006), causing further detriment to politics, potentially delegitimising it. This could harm the governing institutions as fewer numbers of the electorate engage politically, and in worst case scenario, could cause the systems in place to disband (Bermeo, 2003), highlighting the somewhat paradoxical and potentially destructive outcomes of governments attempting to justify war in the name of democracy, hence I have argued against the question.

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